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between the strong-arm clause and the other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act, restores a proper balance betwccn the conflicting interests of secured
and unsecured creditors, and reduces the unwarranted interference by
the Federal and State governments in each other's affairs. Its main beneficial aspect, aside from policy considerations discussed by the Court, is
that it eliminates the worst of the bad effects the Bankruptcy Act could
4t
have upon increases in state homestead exemptions. 1 As previously
47
however, no great equitable benefits flow from the Lewis
suggested
decision, though certainly no great inequities are produced. Its practical
result will be to ease the strain on secured transactions and to create a
somewhat greater risk in unsccured transactions. Perhaps the most valid
criticism of Constance v. Harvey is that it injected unnecessary uncertainty
into the law. The great virtue of the Lewis case is that it removes this
Secured transactions can now be entered into without the
uncertainty.
former nagging concern over whether or not, at some undetermined time
in the future, the security will be disallowed in bankruptcy. All concerned can now breathe more easily.
CHARLES

PHILLIPS

STANDING TO OBJECT TO AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH
AND SEIZURE
A subject of constituional and criminal law which has received much
serious consideration during the past 50 years is unlawful search and seizure.
Since the advent of the automobile with the resultant transient society
which characterizes life in the United States today, search and seizure has
acquired a complexity not exceeded by any other aspect of criminal law.
The U.S. Constiution provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
' The right to object to
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .
unreasonable search and seizure is considered a personal right and can only
46.

47.

Supra note 15. Although the overruling of Constance removes the most lethal of
the trustee's weapons for invalidation of state exemptions in bankruptcy, it by no
means assures that all exemptions will now be honored therein. Where filing is
not completed, though required for perfection of the exemption, the trustee can
still invalidate the exemption in bankruptcy through his status as lien creditor tinder the strong-arm clause. Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 815. Further. where there are actual general creditors,
however small, prior to the exemption or to an increase therein, the trustee can
avoid in toto the exemption or increase under section 70e (1) and the doctrine of
Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4. 52 S.Ct. 3, 76 L.Sd. 133, e.g., England v. Sanderson, 236
F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956) in view of the later case of Miller v. Sulmeyer, 263 F.2d
513 (9th Cir. 1959).
Supra note 35. As there suggested, Constance could produce inequitable results
with respect to security interests entered into before Constance. The same reasoning would lead to the conclusion that a windfall to secured creditors who became

such after Constance has resulted front the Lewis case, in that the Constance

produced risk was discounted in those transactions, a risk that no longer exists.

1.

U.S. Const., Amend. IV. Cf., identical langlage in Wyo. Const., Art. I, § 4. This
note is concerned with federal courts and those states whose rules of evidence
provide for a motion to suppress or return of evidence seized as the result of an
illegal search and seizure.

NOTES

be exercised by the person whose rights are being or have been violated. 2
Under Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may
move the district court for the district in which the propeity was
seized for the return of the property and to suppress for use as
evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without a warrant, (2) the warrant is
insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that
described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for
believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was
issued, and (5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge
shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision
of the motion. . ..
If the defendant disclaims any interest whatsoever in the property
seized at the time of the search, he cannot later object to its introduction
into evidence on the grounds that the search was illegal. 4 If he does
claim some interest in the property, what character of interest must he
show in order to give him standing to object?
The formula stated and repeated ... is that, in order to complain of an illegal search and seizure, a person must own or lease
or control, or lawfully occupy or rightfully possess, or have an
interest in the premises or property searched and taken. 5
Courts have carefully scrutinized how the party who is objecting came
into custody of the premises. Willful trespassers lose the requisite standing
to object if the owner, after notice of their presence, treats them as trespassers. 6 However, a violation by a lessee of a covenant not to sublet
the premises does not deprive the sublessees of standing to object if they
can show that the landlord had constructive notice of their presence and
did not object. 7 Therefore, knowledge of the owner is crucial in determining whether the people occupying the premises have standing, since
acquiescence, with knowledge, takes them out of the category of trespassers.8 Mere silence or acquiescence by the landlord, after he has notice,
may be enough to prove lawful occupancy.
The right to use a certain chattel or real property may give the user
the right to object to a search and seizure regardless of the technical legal
relationship, if any, thereby created between owner and user. For example,
a person's exclusive right to use a certain desk in an office room of a
government agency gave the user standing to object to a search of the
desk even though the desk was the property of the government and her
immediate superior gave the agents express permission to search the desk.9
2.

Edwards v. State, 94 Okla. Cr. 11, 228 P.2d 672 (1951).
3. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41(c), 18 U.S.C.A.
4. Gaskins v. United States, 218 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
5. Kapler v. State, 194 Md. 580, 582, 71 A.2d 860, 862 (1950).
The same rule is
stated in Powell v. Commonwealth, 282 S.W.2d 340 (1955), Brown v. United States,
83 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1936).
6. Carter v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 695, 28 S.W.2d 976 (1930).
7. Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1931).
Tenants not considered trespassers when neither lessor or lessee made any demand that they leave.
8. Steber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952).
9. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951), Contra, United States v.
Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944).

WYOMING

LAAV

JOURNAL

Here the agents were looking for private property of a personal sort.
Standing to object to the search in cases such as these seems to depend on
nature of the object seized, and the purpose of the search. If the search
of an employer's premises and subsequent seizure of some object is for
the purpose of obtaining evidence against the employee, then the employee
may be given standing to object to the search. On the other hand, an

employee having mere physical custody and control of an illegal business
cannot raise the objection of the seizure being unreasonable, because he
cannot be aggrieved by the seizure of the employer's propertyO
The court hearing the motion for suppression or return of the evidence
seized will also look at the "degree" of possession in determining whether
the person objecting to a search and seizure has standing to object. A
lawful bailee of an automobile has been held to have interest of sufficient
substance to fall within the constitutional protection even though his
possession is only temporary. 1 But a person who has home furniture in a
cabin does not have a sufficient interest to establish dominion over the
cabin so he can object to a search of the cabin.' 2 However, if the property
seized on another's premises is property belonging to the defendant, he is
allowed standing to object even though he is not an occupant of the house
where the seizure took place.' 3 Such cases as these can be reconciled by
observing what interest was subject to the search and subsequent seizure.
If the objecting party's interest was not affected, then he lacks standing,
whereas a person whose property is actually seized can prove standing.
Standing to object exists if the person objecting can adequately
demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that his interest in the property is
as great as that of another person also lawfully using the property. Therefore, where defendant's property was seized in a building owned by his
brother, but used by the defendant and his brother jointly, this was
enough to prove standing even though title to the real estate was in the
14
brother's name and the defendant was not a tenant in the strict sense.
In a Wyoming case' 5 where the defendant's sheep were seized on government land, the defendant's right to object was sustained on the ground
that his right to be on the property was as great as that of the public
generally, including the officer who made the seizure.' 6 The court, without
explicitly stating that the defendant had standing, assumed he did
because the court felt it was necessary to inquire into the reasonableness
of the seizure. 17 As can readily be observed, any fact concerning the
manner by which the objector obtained possession may be material to
Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d

10.

Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932),
R43 (8th Cir. 1932).

11.

Ellsworth v. State, 295 P.2d 296 (Okla. 1956) , State v. Hoover.

Ore.

347

P.2d 69 (1959); Contra, Lee v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. 220, 185 S.W. 978 (1945), Pruitt

12.
13.

v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.2d 551 (Ky. 1956).
Grainger v. United States, 158 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1946).
Jeffers v. United States, 187 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1951), Wood v. State. 156 Tex. Cr.

14.

419, 243 S.W.2d 31 (1951).
Rausch v. State, 75 Okla. 299, 131 P.2d 133 (1942).

15.
16.

State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 Pac. 683 (1924).
Ibid.

17.

Id. at 32 Wyo. 223, 240, 231 Pac. 683, 688.

NOTES

the issue of whether the person making the objection has standing to
object.
Most courts, including the lower federal courts, have held that a guest
or an invitee on real property does not ipso facto have sufficient interest or
possession to give him standing to object to a search and seizure of property
of the owner."' The basis of this rule is that the personal rights of the
guest or invitee are not being violated.
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Martin, 9 following the
so-called "Exclusionary Rule" of evidence, took the position that all
evidence obtained through an unlawful search and seizure is inadmissible,
regardless of whose constitutional rights were violated. 20 The court felt
that the traditional rule that third parties could not object to an unreasonable search and seizure only inivted law enforcement officers to violate
constitutional guarantees; and that the purpose of adopting the Exclusion21
ary Rule was to discourage such abuse.
As a result of the rule of the Martin case, a guest has standing to
object to a search and seizure in California. The right of the moving party
is no longer dependent upon minute distinctions as to interest, possession,
or lawful occupancy. His standing is based on whether the search and
seizure violated the constitutional rights of anybody affected by the search,
and not necessarily the property rights of the objector.22 Nor is it of any
consequence that at the time of the search the defendant disclaimed possession or ownership of the property seized, or consented to the search. The
courts of California can no longer dispose of the motion to suppress made
by a guest or third party simply by stating that he has no rights which can
be violated by the search of the owner's premises. Legality of the search
and seizure is decided entirely without reference to "standing" to object in
the traditional sense.
The Martin decision has merit in at least one respect: it throws the
judicial spotlight on the methods employed by the police in making the
search and seizure. But the Exclusionary Rule places a heavy burden on
the police to make sure that every facit of the search, from the issuance of
the warrant to introduction of the evidence in court, has been carefully
and lawfully executed, and may allow a guilty person to escape because of
failure to follow the rulebook exactly.
The United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Jones v.
United States,2a noted that it had never passed on the question of the
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

State v. Smith, 118 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1960), Paige v. State, 161 Tex. Cr. 637, 279 S.W.2d
345 (1955), In re Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942), Barnes v. Commonwealth,
312 Ky. 768, 229 S.W.2d 757 (1950).
45 Cal.2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
Ibid. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 93 L.Ed. 1782, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949). held that
states could adopt the Exclusionary Rule although they were not required by the
Fourteenth Amendment to exclude evidence heretofore admissible. California
adopted the Exclusionary Rule in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905
(1955).
Supra note 19.
People v. Colonna, 140 Cal.App.2d 705, 295 P.2d 490 (1956).
Jones v. United States- ____U.S. __ __ L.Ed. .
80 S.Ct. 725 (1960).
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degree of interest in a premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress.
The defendant, Jones, was a guest in the apartment of another when
agents came and searched the apartment, finding narcotics on Jones's person
and in the apartment. Jones testified that the narcotics were not his nor
was the partment his. The defendant was in the contradictory position
of having the evidence used against him, because he denied possession or
interest in the narcotics, while at the same time he could not object to
the search because he was a guest in the apartment.2 4 In the course of
the opinion, the Court stated:
Distinctions such as those between "lessee," "licensee," "invitee," and "guest," often only of gossamer strength ought not to
determinative in fashioning
the procedures ultimately referable to
constitutional safeguards. 25
The Court then noted that it had done away with such distinctions
in a case under the law of maritime torts in which it stated "for the
admiralty law at this late date to import such conceptual distinctions
would be foreign to its traditions of simplicity and practicality." 26 The
Court noted no reason why the same could not be done as far as the
administration of criminal law was concerned:
No just interest of the government in the effective and rigorous
enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing
that anyone on the premises where a search occurs may challenge
its legality by way of a motion 27
to suppress, when its fruits are
purposed to be used against him.
But the Court explicitly stated that people wrongfully on the
premises could not object.
As petitioner's testimony established Evan's consent to his
presence in the apartment, he vwas28 entitled to have the merits of his
motion to suppress adjudicated.
Even were this not a prosecution turning on illicit possession,
the legally requisite interest in the premises was here satisfied, for
it need not be as extensive
a property interest as was required
29
by the courts below.
Since the Jones case arose in the federal courts, the decision is not
binding on the states, and it would not be binding until the United States
Supreme Court reached a similar decision on a case that arose in a state
court. Clearly the decision of the Jones case does not preclude the states
from adopting the decision as one of their rules of evidence.
In conclusion, the traditional rule is that standing to object to a search
and seizure will depend on whether the moving party claimed or denied
ownership or an interest in the premises at the time of the search, how he
obtained possession, what property is being seized, and the object of the
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Ibid.
Id. at 80 S.Ct. 725, 733.
Ibid. at p. 734.
Ibid.
Supra note 26.
Ibid. at p. 732.
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search. Generally, under this rule one must claim some lawful interest
in the subject being seized before he can object to the reasonableness and
legality of the search.
Let us suppose that a defendant, who is objecting to the introduction
into evndence of certain personal property, denies any right, title, or
interest in the property seized, and further, that he was not on the
premises at the time the allegedly illegal search and seizure took place.
Under the California view, he would have standing to object if he could
prove that someone's constitutional guarantees were violated in procurement of the evidence. However, under the Jones or Federal viewpoint, he
would not have standing to object because the right is limited to those
people who were on the premises at the time the search and seizure took
place.
The view of the United States Supreme Court that the right to object
should be limited to those people on the premises at the time of the search
regardless of whether they are there as guests, invitees or licensees, is a
desirable limitation. The Martin or California view seems impractical
because it gives the defendant standing to object no matter what his
proximity or relation to the case, as long as some one's constitutional
guarantees have been violated. There is no logical reason why a guest
should not have standing. It seems safe to predict that most states, including Wyoming, will fall in line with the Jones viewpoint.
ROBERT A. DARLING

EFFECT OF SATISFYING A JUNIOR LIEN ON STATUTORY
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

This article deals with the question of whether a purchaser at a foreclosure or execution sale can prevent "statutory redemption" by a junior
lien holder by tendering payment of the debt which the lien secures.'
2
Because our concern is with the statutory right of redemption, it is
felt that equity of redemption should be distinguished; and that any

1.
2.

The principal question, so far as the author has been able to ascertain, has never
been decided by a court of record.
The redemption statutes of the several states which have them are sufficiently
similar, for purposes of this article, so that Wyoming's statutes will suffice as adequate
refernce.
§ 1-480, W.S. 1957, provides that, "It shall be lawful for any person, his heirs,
executors, administrators, assigns, or guarantors, whose lands or tenenments have
been sold by virute of an execution, decree of foreclosure, or foreclosure by advertisement and sale, within six months from the date of sale to redeem .. "
§ 1-481, XV.S. 1957, provides that, "After the expiration of six months and at
any time before the expiration of nine months from date of sale . . . it shall be
lawful for any judgment creditor of the person whose lands have been sold, or for
any grantee or mortgagee of said lands and tenements so sold, to redeem the same.
• . .If no redemption be made within nine months of the date of sale, the purchaser
or his assignee is entitled to a sheriff's deed to the property, or if so redeemed,
whenever thirty days has elapsed and no other redemption has been made, the
last redemption or his assignee shall be entitled to a sheriff's deed."

